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Abstract Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if
God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately
benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of
theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a
common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely
potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward
suffering.
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Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists,
then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the
sufferer.1 Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism
conflicts with ordinary morality.2 For example, if every instance of undeserved,
unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer, then human persons never have
an obligation to prevent such suffering; yet, ordinary morality dictates otherwise. In
this paper, I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of
these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in
determining our moral obligations toward suffering.
& T. Ryan Byerly
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1 In addition to the main interlocutors of this paper, proponents of this claim include Adams (1999),
Rowe (1986), Stump (1990), and Tooley (1991).
2 See Jordan (2004), Maitzen (2009, 2013), and Wielenberg (MS).
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In order to defend this claim, I will proceed as follows. In ‘‘The actual world
formulation’’ section, I set out one version of the above argument, and show how it
falls prey to the mistake I have highlighted. The version of the argument set forth in
‘‘The actual world formulation’’ section, however, is improvable, and indeed in
some places some of the authors referred to above have improved upon it. Thus, in
‘‘The necessity formulation’’ section, I set forth an improved version of the
argument faithful to these authors. I show, nonetheless, that even this improved
version suffers from the same problem, albeit less obviously. In ‘‘Responses to
objections’’ section, I engage with two important objections to my argument. The
upshot of the paper, if successful, is that the style of argument employed by these
authors cannot show that ordinary morality implies atheism.
The Actual World Formulation
The first version of the argument that ordinary morality implies atheism focuses on
the consequences of theism for the actual world.3 It proposes, in particular, that:
(1) If God exists, then all actual instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering
produce a net benefit for the sufferer.4
The defender of the argument then attempts to show that the claim that all actual
instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering produce a net benefit for the sufferer—
the consequent of claim (1)—conflicts in one way or another with ordinary morality.
Because it does, God’s existence conflicts with ordinary morality.
The authors who have defended this kind of argument all explain this conflict
either in terms of a conflict with the obligations or the reasons that are constitutive
of our ordinary, commonsense moral commitments. The conflict is that while the
consequent of (1) implies that we do or don’t have some moral obligation or reason
for action, ordinary morality dictates otherwise. For example, it might be argued [as
in (Jordan 2004, p. 174)] that while the consequent of (1) implies that we never have
a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering, our ordinary moral
3 The arguments in Jordan (2004, p. 174) and Maitzen (2013, p. 260) come closest to endorsing this
version, rather than the version to be discussed in ‘‘The necessity formulation’’ section. The presentation
in Maitzen (2013), however, is perhaps to be explained in part by the context in which it appears—in a
book not aimed primarily at philosophers. The earlier (Maitzen 2009), published in a specialist journal in
philosophy of religion, presents a version more akin to that discussed in ‘‘The necessity formulation’’
section.
4 Although they play no significant role in this paper, two features of claim (1) are worth highlighting for
those interested in the broader context of the debate to which this paper is contributing. First, the language
of ‘‘producing a net benefit’’ has a narrow meaning that is important in some contributions to this debate.
By claiming that the suffering produces a net benefit, the consequent of (1) implies that the suffering was
necessary for this benefit, and that the net value had the suffering not occurred would not have been as
high as it was with the suffering and this benefit. Second, following Maitzen (2009, 2013), an argument
with the same structure as that in the text can get off the ground with a weaker first premise that takes into
account the idea of retrospective consent appealed to by some theist philosophers, such as Alston (1996).
The weaker premise would be: If God exists, then either (i) all actual instances of undeserved, unwanted
suffering produce a net benefit for the sufferer or (ii) all subjects who undergo instances of undeserved,
unwanted suffering will ultimately retrospectively consent to this suffering.
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commitments include a commitment to our sometimes having an obligation to
prevent such suffering. Or, it might be argued [as in (Wielenberg MS)] that while
the consequent of (1) implies that we have fact-relative reason to cause underserved,
unwanted suffering, it would make life absurd if our ordinary moral commitments
contained such reason.
For simplification, I will focus my discussion here on the impact of the
consequent of (1) on our moral obligations, though what I will say in response to the
argument formulated in this way applies just as well to versions of the argument that
focus instead on moral reasons. The second claim of the argument can accordingly
be presented as follows:
(2) If all actual instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering produce a net benefit
for the sufferer, then the moral obligations of human persons are not as
ordinary morality dictates.
The remainder of the argument can be completed straightforwardly. It is affirmed
next that
(3) The moral obligations of human persons are as ordinary morality dictates.
and so concluded that
(4) God does not exist. (from 1, 2 and 3)
With (1)–(4), we have an interesting and important moral argument for atheism.
While there are various strategies one might employ to object to this argument,5 I
will focus on a strategy that has not yet received sustained attention from defenders
of this kind of argument.6 The strategy objects to claim (2) on the grounds that it is
not only the actual instances of an action type that determine the moral status of
actions of that type, but the merely potential instances as well. This point is an
important one emphasized, for example, by rule consequentialist moral theories,
though it is not restricted to them.7 It is also emphasized, for example, by Kantian-
inspired moral theories that invoke universalizability—the idea, roughly, that action
types are wrong if the actor could not coherently will that all persons in relevantly
similar circumstances perform instances of these action types. For my illustrative
purposes here, I will focus on the role of merely potential instances of action types
in rule consequentialist moral theories.
On such theories, even if all actual instances of an action type have ultimately
beneficial consequences, the deleterious consequences of merely potential instances
5 Maitzen (2009, 2013) and Jordan (2004) each survey several strategies at length, including strategies
that deny (1), strategies that attempt to retain our ordinary moral commitments by appealing to self-
directed reasons for preventing or refraining from causing suffering, and strategies that attempt to retain
our ordinary moral commitments by appealing to divine command metaethics. Gellman (2010) develops a
different response, and Maitzen (2010) replies.
6 To the extent that it is discussed at all, it is discussed only briefly in (Maitzen 2009, fn. 4). However,
this brief discussion overlooks the arguments made in ‘‘The necessity formulation’’ section.
7 For a recent discussion of Kant’s own employment of universalizability as well as contemporary
adaptations of it, see Johnson (2008).
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of this action type can render the actual instances morally wrong.8 For example, if
the only instance of a particular variety of injustice in the actual world were one that
happened to have ultimately beneficial consequences, it could still be that this
injustice was morally wrong because, if human persons were generally to commit
such injustices whenever opportunity arose, this would lead to disastrous
consequences. One might put the point slightly differently by saying that, while
in certain peculiar circumstances, actions of this type can lead to ultimately
beneficial consequences, actions of this type nonetheless tend to have ultimately
deleterious consequences, and this is why they have the moral status they do.
Abstracting away from rule consequentialist moral theories, the general point is
this. The moral status of actions is determined not merely by facts about actual
instances of those action types, but by facts about merely potential instances as well.
We might express the relevant facts using subjunctive language or we might do so
using dispositional language, and I will here remain neutral about whether such
language is ultimately interchangeable.9 If we use subjunctive language, then the
relevant facts are facts about what would be the case if there were certain instances
of these action types that do not actually exist. If we use dispositional language, the
relevant facts are facts about the tendencies of acts of this type, including non-actual
instances of such acts.
The lesson for assessing this first version of the argument that ordinary morality
implies atheism is the following. Nothing conflicting with ordinary morality follows
from the mere fact that all actual instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering
produce a net benefit for the sufferer. It does not follow, for example, that there is no
obligation to prevent such suffering. For, while it may be that all actual instances of
undeserved, unwanted suffering promote a net benefit for the sufferer, nothing has
thus far been said to rule out the possibility that if human persons were, as a general
policy, to refrain from preventing such suffering whenever they had opportunity
(and the suffering were to therefore occur),10 their doing so would be disastrous.11
Nothing has been said thus far to rule out the possibility that despite their
consequences in the actual world, actions of failing to prevent undeserved,
unwanted suffering tend, especially when multiplied, to be overall destructive. But
these possibilities are directly relevant to assessing whether it is ever obligatory to
prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering. And, indeed, prima facie, it seems that
these possibilities are quite plausible. That is, prima facie, it is quite plausible that
8 For an up-to-date overview of rule consequentialist moral theories, see Hooker (2015).
9 The relationship between ascriptions of dispositions and ascriptions of relevant subjunctive
conditionals is a complex one, with some philosophers maintaining that such ascriptions are ultimately
just different ways of saying the same thing. For an overview of the relationship, see Choi and Fara
(2012).
10 Throughout the remainder of the paper, I will often talk of human persons ‘‘refraining from preventing
suffering,’’ and when I do so I mean to imply that the suffering in fact occurs because of this refraining. I
will not unnecessarily complicate the presentation by repeating the parenthetical phrase inserted in the
text here.
11 ‘‘Disastrous’’ here needn’t be given a consequentialist reading. The claim that such refraining would
be ‘‘disastrous’’ might be understood to mean that such refraining would have everything going against it
according to one’s preferred moral theory (whether consequentialist or not) without also having in its
favor the fact that it produces a net benefit for the sufferers.
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refraining from preventing undeserved, unwanted suffering tends to be overall
destructive, and that if human persons were to as a general policy refrain from such
prevention this would be disastrous. Claim (2), then, is highly questionable.
The necessity formulation
While the objection developed in ‘‘The actual world formulation’’ section may be
convincing enough so far as it goes, the moral argument for atheism presented in
that section can easily be improved. Moreover, it can be improved in a way that may
at least at first glance appear to avoid the objection raised in ‘‘The actual world
formulation’’ section. In this section, I consider this revised argument, which I take
to better represent the best versions of the moral argument for atheism contained in
the writings of the authors with whom I am engaging. I argue that, perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, this improved version does not ultimately avoid the
objection.
The improved version of the moral argument for atheism focuses on the
consequences of theism not just for the actual world, but for all possible worlds. For,
given that God’s existence is necessary, what is true of all actual instances of
undeserved, unwanted suffering is plausibly also true of all merely possible
instances as well. Thus, we can replace (1) with
(1*) If God exists, then all possible instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering
produce a net benefit for the sufferer.
The consequent of (1*) will then replace the antecedent of (2), yielding:
(2*) If all possible instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering produce a net
benefit for the sufferer, then the moral obligations of human persons are not
as ordinary morality dictates.
The remainder of the argument continues as before. With (1*), (2*), (3) and (4), we
have a revised moral argument for atheism.
Moreover, the revised argument appears to be a significantly improved revision.
While there are some who would baulk at replacing (1) with (1*), (1*) will
nonetheless be granted by a great many theists and non-theists alike who are
prepared to grant (1). So, the cost of this replacement is minimal. Yet, the benefit of
replacing (2) with (2*) may appear quite significant. After all, the objection of the
previous section was that (2) illicitly assumes that it is only the actual instances of
an action type that are relevant for the moral status of actions of that type, when
merely potential instances are relevant as well. Yet, a defender of (2*) needn’t
concede that only actual instances are relevant. Indeed, she can even maintain, for
example, that all possible failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering are
relevant for the moral status of actual failures to prevent such suffering. How then
could she be accused of overlooking the role of merely potential failures to prevent
suffering?
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I actually think there is a good answer to this question. One way to see the answer
is to return to the kinds of facts that were cited in section one as relevant for
assessing the moral status of actual instances of failing to prevent suffering. I
offered there two proposals for how to understand these facts. One proposal used
subjunctive conditionals. On this proposal, it is relevant for the moral status of
actual failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering what would be the case if
human persons were to fail to prevent such suffering as a general policy whenever
given opportunity. If failing to prevent such suffering as a general policy would be
disastrous, then this speaks against the morality of actual failures to prevent such
suffering. The other proposal used dispositional language. On this proposal, it is
relevant for the moral status of actual failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted
suffering whether such failures, or such failures when multiplied, tend toward
disaster. If they do, this speaks against the morality of actual failures to prevent
suffering.
The way in which the revised argument overlooks merely potential failures to
prevent suffering can now be explained in two ways. First, claim (2*) will only be
plausible if facts about all possible instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering are
sufficient to determine all that is relevant to assessing the moral status of actual
actions concerned with such suffering. But, the subjunctive facts cited in the
previous paragraph, which are relevant for assessing the morality of actual failures
to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering, are quite plausibly not determined by
the facts about all possible instances of such suffering. For, given (1*), it is plausible
that there is no possible world in which human persons, as a general policy, fail to
prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering. God simply never would create such a
world, precisely because such a world would be morally disastrous.12 Any world in
which human persons as a general policy fail to prevent undeserved, unwanted
suffering is an impossible world. So, subjunctive facts about how things would be if
human persons as a general policy failed to prevent such suffering are not merely
counterfactuals, they are counterpossibles. As such, their truth-values cannot be
determined solely by looking at possible worlds and at what failures to prevent
suffering are like there. Rather, their truth-values are determined by examining how
things are in impossible worlds in which human persons do as a general policy fail
to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering. Given that the disastrousness of such
worlds is precisely the reason why they are impossible, it is plausible for the theist
to maintain that it would be disastrous if human persons were (counterpossibly) to
fail to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering in the way they do in such worlds.
And because it would be, human persons do have a moral obligation to prevent such
suffering in the actual world.
Much the same line of argument can be applied to the facts expressed using
dispositional language. Given (1*), the question of whether failures to prevent
undeserved, unwanted suffering tend toward disaster cannot be answered by looking
to the manifestations of possible instances of such failures alone. All of these, given
12 Some readers will wonder whether the theist can reasonably maintain that there is good reason to think
such a world would indeed be morally disastrous. I discuss this question at length in ‘‘The subjunctive and
dispositional facts cannot be known’’ section.
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(1*), will produce net benefits for the sufferer. But, this may be the case precisely
because these instances of failing to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering are
exceptions to the rule. They are permitted by God only because, given certain
peculiarities about the sufferer and the person who fails to prevent her suffering,
they produce a net benefit for the sufferer. But, they do not generally tend to
produce such benefits. They tend instead to produce disaster. It is just that this
tendency is covered up in every possible world because, in every possible world,
God only permits instances of such failures that, because of the peculiar
circumstances in which they take place, happen not to give rise to the disaster
toward which they tend.
Each of these lines of argument against claim (2*) in the revised moral argument
for atheism can be strengthened through appeal to recent philosophical develop-
ments. The first line of argument that appeals to counterpossible conditionals about
what would be the case if human persons were to, as a general policy, fail to prevent
undeserved, unwanted suffering, can be strengthened by appealing to recent work
on counterpossible conditionals. It has become increasingly popular, especially
within recent work in the Philosophy of Religion, to deny that all counterpossible
conditionals are trivially true. One finds, for example, on both sides of the aisle of
the debate about the compossibility of perfect goodness and omnipotence authors
who maintain that there are non-trivially true as well as false counterpossible
conditionals.13 This bolsters the key idea appealed to here that there is a non-trivial
fact of the matter about the disaster that would (counterpossibly) obtain were human
persons to embark on a general policy of failing to prevent undeserved, unwanted
suffering. And given that there is such a fact of the matter, there is good reason to
deny (2*), according to the moral theories cited earlier in which potential instances
of action types play an important role in determining the moral status of actual
instances of those action types.
The second line of argument against (2*) can be bolstered through appealing to
recent work defending the fundamentality of dispositions. This work challenges
views which attempt to analyse dispositional ascriptions in terms of subjunctive
conditionals. It is commonly pointed out in this work that dispositions can be
masked so that they do not give rise to their constitutive manifestations. The
tendency of a fragile vase to shatter when dropped, for example, can be masked if
the vase is wrapped in a protective covering.14 This bolsters the key idea appealed to
in the second line of argument against (2*) that particular failures to prevent
undeserved, unwanted suffering can have a tendency toward disaster even if they do
not give rise to it in light of the peculiarities in which they take place. Yet, given the
moral theories alluded to earlier, the fact that failing to prevent instances of
undeserved, unwanted suffering tends toward disaster, or the fact that it does so
when practiced as a general policy, provides reason to think that we do have an
obligation not to fail in this way.
Thus, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that even the improved,
necessity formulation of the moral argument for atheism is threatened by much the
13 See, e.g., Pearce and Pruss (2012) and Morriston (2009).
14 See, e.g., Bird (1998) and Johnston (1992).
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same objection that threatens the weaker, actual world formulation. Some may
quibble with my description of this problem as involving an oversight of the role of
merely potential instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering. After all, the
instances in view in this section are impossible instances, and so one might well
maintain they are not potential at all. The point of the section remains, though,
whether or not we eschew the convenient abbreviation ‘‘potential instances of
suffering.’’ What matters is that the subjunctive and dispositional facts cited in this
section are relevant for the moral status of our actual behaviours toward undeserved,
unwanted suffering, and these facts are not determined by the fact that all possible
instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering produce a net benefit for the sufferer.
Thus, (2*) is in jeopardy. The support for atheism offered by the necessity
formulation of the moral argument for atheism is consequently much weaker than its
defenders have thought.
Responses to objections
In this final section, I anticipate and respond to the two best objections to the
argument I have thus far presented of which I am aware.
The subjunctive and dispositional facts cannot be known
It is important for the defence of my argument that certain subjunctive or
dispositional facts can be known by the theist. For example, the theist needs to be
able to know that were all human persons to as a general policy fail to prevent
undeserved, unwanted suffering, this would be disastrous. Or she needs to be able to
know that failing to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering tends toward disaster.
For, it is on the basis of such facts that she claims that any world in which human
persons were as a general policy to permit undeserved, unwanted suffering is an
impossible world. And this is key to her resistance to the moral argument for
atheism. Yet, it seems problematic to maintain that she can know these facts.
To see the problem, note the following asymmetry between the atheist and the
theist. The atheist can maintain that we know the relevant facts, and that our
knowledge of the relevant facts is inferred from our knowledge of the badness of
particular, actual instances of failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering.
For instance, it is because we think that actual failures to prevent undeserved,
unwanted suffering are disastrous that we are inclined to think that disaster would
ensue if we as a general policy engaged in such failures. The theist, however, cannot
accept this explanation of our knowledge of these facts. For, she denies that actual
failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering are disastrous. How, then, can
she explain our knowledge of these facts, which is so important to her objection to
the moral argument for atheism?
I propose the following response on behalf of the theist. Independent from the
assumption of (1) or (1*), the theist has just as much reason as the atheist to affirm
that actual failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering are disastrous. When
she comes to accept (1) or (1*) as a result of her theism, it surprises to her to find out
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that that actual failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefit
the sufferer. There must be something peculiar about these actual instances that
explains how it is that they ultimately benefit the sufferer, she thinks. Indeed, to the
extent that it is not plausible that there is something peculiar about them that
explains how it is that they ultimately benefit the sufferer, her confidence in theism
will diminish. If the world contained many more and various instances of these
kinds—in particular, if it were to be the case that every human person upon every
opportunity permitted all manner of suffering to her fellows—she would give up her
theism altogether.
Theists in this kind of evidential position can plausibly maintain that they know
the relevant subjunctive or dispositional facts needed to embrace my response to the
moral argument for atheism. Independent of (1) or (1*), their evidence would
support the claim that certain actual failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted
suffering do not ultimately benefit the sufferer. (1) or (1*) provides a defeater for
this. However, the conjunction of their former evidence with (1) or (1*) still
supports the relevant claims from my objection: that failing to prevent undeserved,
unwanted suffering tends toward disaster, and that were human beings as a general
policy to fail to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering, this would be disastrous.
We might express the point using the language of anomaly. The theist who
accepts (1) or (1*) and wishes to coherently employ my response to the moral
argument for atheism has the following cognitive features. Her commitment to
theism and to (1) or (1*) can withstand certain anomalies, or apparent counterin-
stances—instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering that don’t seem to her,
independent of (1) or (1*), to benefit the sufferer. In particular, her commitment to
theism can withstand apparent counterinstances comparable to those we find in the
actual world. Yet, there is a threshold of such apparent counterinstances beyond
which her commitment to theism will be retracted. And this threshold would be
surpassed exceedingly if the world were such that human beings as a general policy
failed to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering whenever opportunity arose. Such
a theist, I propose, can coherently maintain that she knows the relevant subjunctive
or dispositional facts necessary for defending my objection to the moral argument
for atheism, while denying that this knowledge is based on her knowledge that
actual instances of undeserved, unwanted suffering are morally disastrous.15
Of course, not every theist will be willing to embrace the perspective required
here concerning the extent to which evil disconfirms theism. Some theists will
prefer the (in my opinion, very strong) view that no matter what evils there are, they
do not disconfirm God’s existence.16 Perhaps, for example, it is by virtue of God’s
15 This response is briefly anticipated in a remark from Eleonore Stump, who writes that even given (1)
or (1*), ‘‘all human suffering is prima facie evil, and since we do not know with any high degree of
probability how much (if any) of it is likely to result in good for any particular sufferer on any particular
occasion, it is reasonable for us to eliminate the suffering as much as we can (1985, pp. 412–413).’’ By
calling such suffering ‘‘prima facie evil,’’ I suggest Stump is making much the point I am in the text that
independent of (1) or (1*), the theist has good reason to think that actual instances of undeserved,
unwanted suffering are disastrous, and this good reason also provides reason to think that the relevant
subjunctive or dispositional facts are true.
16 For example, some authors who defend skeptical theism appear to favour this view. See, e.g., Howard-
Snyder and Bergmann (2004).
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omnipotence that for any evils whatsoever, God can guarantee that those evils are
required for promoting outweighing goods for those who suffer them.17,18 Such
theists cannot embrace the response to the moral argument for atheism that I have
developed in this paper; they must search for an alternative. However, for any
theists who do not embrace such a view regarding the extent to which evil
disconfirms theism—and there are plenty19—the response I have developed here
remains a viable option. Thus, while the present objection teaches us that the
response to the moral argument for atheism I have developed in this paper is not
universally available for theists, it does not show that the response does not expose a
significant shortcoming in this argument.
The response eliminates free will
A second important objection to my response to the moral argument for atheism is
that it eliminates free will. This is because the response maintains that it is
impossible for human persons as a general policy to fail to prevent undeserved,
unwanted suffering. Yet, if it is impossible for human persons as a general policy to
fail to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering, then human persons are not free to
as a general policy fail to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering. And surely they
are free to do so.
I think there are several worthwhile responses to this objection. One might
question, first, why we should maintain that human persons are free, as a general
policy, to fail to prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering. As some of the authors
who have defended the arguments with which I am interacting in this paper have
highlighted, many human beings find the prospect of inflicting or failing to prevent
undeserved, unwanted suffering psychologically unbearable.20 Yet, it is quite a
fashionable view that a psychological make-up that makes certain kinds of actions
unbearable can render one unfree with respect to performing those actions. A good
parent, for example, is not free to torture her child for a nickel.21
Second, one might argue that while it is not possible that every actual person
embarks simultaneously on a programme of failing to prevent undeserved,
unwanted suffering, it nonetheless is possible of each actual person that she fails
to prevent such suffering. In other words, there are possible worlds where each of us
fails to prevent such suffering, but no possible worlds where all of us do so
routinely. Yet, it is enough to retain our freedom to fail to prevent such suffering
that each of us in some possible world fails to prevent such suffering. At least, these
17 One anonymous reviewer suggests that this is how Adams’s (1999) theodicy should be understood.
This seems to me a controversial interpretation, however, as her explicit aim is limited to providing a
theodicy for the sorts of evils we find in the actual world.
18 One problem with such a view is that it assigns to God control over modal facts—specifically, facts
regarding what is required for what. The relationship between God and modal facts, however, is hotly
debated. For a sample of the recent debate, see Gould (2014).
19 For a representative example of the approach to the evidential relationship between evil and God
invoked here that itself uses the language of anomaly, see Doughery and Pruss (2014).
20 This idea plays an important role, particularly, for Wielenberg (MS).
21 For a recent defense of this idea, see Timpe (2012).
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possibilities are enough to retain the extent of freedom to fail to prevent suffering
that plausibly is enjoyed by us.
Third, and perhaps most controversially, one might maintain that the fact that it is
impossible for all of us simultaneously to embark on a programme of failing to
prevent undeserved, unwanted suffering is not a sufficient reason for thinking that we
are not free to do this. In much the way that failures to prevent undeserved, unwanted
suffering can have a tendency to give rise to disaster, even if there is no possible world
in which this tendency is manifested in disaster, we human persons have a power or
ability to simultaneously embark on a programme of failing to prevent undeserved,
unwanted suffering, even if there is no possible world in which we exercise this power
or ability. Yet, the relevant power or ability is enough to retain the freedom the
objector seeks to maintain. In much the way that some have recently maintained that
God is free to bring about instances of suffering that ultimately do not benefit the
sufferer, despite the impossibility of God’s doing so,22 human persons are free to
embark on the relevant disastrous programme, despite the impossibility of their doing
so. The fact that the relevant actions are impossible for God is no sign of God’s lack of
control over Godself, but rather is a sign of God’s control over Godself. Likewise, one
might maintain that if it is impossible that all us human persons simultaneously of our
own choosing to embark on a programme of systematically refraining from
preventing suffering, this is a sign of at least some of us having significant control
over ourselves—we simply wouldn’t let ourselves do this. So, even if behaving this
way is impossible, it may be that this does not rule out our being free to do it. There
are, then, several initially promising responses to this second objection as well.
Conclusion
This paper has developed an objection to a kind of argument recently employed by
several authors to show that theism conflicts with ordinary morality. All extant
defences of this kind of argument make a common mistake in overlooking the role
of merely potential instances of suffering in determining the nature of our moral
obligations or reasons. This is not to say that no moral argument for atheism
stressing the surprising consequences of theism for actual or possible instances of
suffering can be defended. But arguments of the kind examined in this paper cannot,
without the present oversight being addressed.23
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
22 See, in particular, (Byerly forthcoming).
23 Thanks to audiences at the Butler Society for Philosophy of Religion and the Glasgow Philosophy of
Religion Seminar, both in 2016, for helpful feedback on drafts of this paper.
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